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Cf. C. G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of Explanation," Philosophy 
of Science, vol. 15 (1948). While this definition is adequate for many purposes, it is 
oversimplified in some ways. Theorem 1 depends on the form of this definition, but our 
general approach is consistent with any explieatum of 'explain.' 
1~ Cf. footnote 6. 
i~ For example, T'~ may state that T~ holds under specified conditions. 
le Cf. H. Feigl's contribution to the symposium on operationism in the Psychological 
Review, vol. 52, no. 5 (September 1945). 
Further Remarks on Definition and Analysis 
by IRVING M. COPI  
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
A NUMBER of acute criticisms have been directed against some of the views 
presented in my essay "Analytical Philosophy and Analytical Propositions" 
(this journal, December 1953). I welcome them as providing stimulation 
and opportunity for penetrating more deeply into the issues involved. 
The central notion in my discussion is that of a theoretical de/init/on. 
A theoretical definition of a term is intended to formulate a theoretically 
adequate characterization of the objects to which that term applies. One 
gives a theoretical definition of a term to attach to the term, as intension, 
tha t  property which in the context of a given theory is most useful for 
understanding or predicting the behavior of those entities which comprise 
the (usual) extension of that term. 
In his "Definitions in Analytical Philosophy" (this journal, April 1954) 
Michael Scriven has correctly observed that a given theoretical definition 
is compatible with a wide range of different theories (p. 38). Several dif- 
ferent theories may have the same vocabulary (of terms or of concepts), or 
they may have parts of their vocabularies in common. And that common 
area of vocabulary may be all that is used in the definition of a given 
term. With  respect to a theoretical definition, therefore, Mr. Scriven is 
right in saying that it is incorrect to talk of the theory which underlies it. 
I am therefore happy to accept his suggestion that my remarks on this 
point should be modified. I would say now that accepting a theoretical 
definition involves accepting as correct some theory in whose terminology 
the definition is formulated. 
It should be clear, however, that a theoretical definition may be disputed 
for either (or both) of two different reasons. One may dispute a theoretical 
definition because of disagreement with the theory one believes to under- 
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lie it. Or one may object to the definition because it assigns to the 
definiendum a meaning which differs too greatly from its prior meaning, 
thus making it denote more or fewer objects than it did in some previous 
usage. It is this second reason to which Mr. Scfiven correctly calls atten- 
tion when he writes that some disputes about theoretical definitions 
"depend on prior meaning of the term, hence imply criticisms of it as 
a lexical definition" (p. 39). But clearly it may be decided that some 
change in a term's extension is not too great a price to pay for the gain 
in theoretical insight (and/or predictive power) achieved by changing 
the intension of that term. For example, chemists have continually re- 
defined the term "acid": earlier, as a substance which in water solution 
yields hydrogen ion; later, as any substance which can give up or transfer 
protons to something else; more broadly, as a substance whose molecule 
can accept a pair of electrons to form a coordinate bond. And it is no 
objection to any of these definitions that the intensions specified by them 
are different from each other, or from the one applied by housewives and 
mechanics in their use of the term. Of course it might be objected that 
the chemist's definition makes water an acid whereas no mechanic or 
housewife would ever use the term "acid" to denote water. Yet the ad- 
vantage achieved in explaining "acid" in terms of ionization (or atomic) 
theory is sufficient to outweigh this objection, and water is referred to 
in chemistry textbooks as a weak acid (as on p. 279 of Smith's College 
Chemistry, Sixth Edition). This departure from the previous meaning 
of the term "acid," extensional as well as intensional, is entirely legitimate. 
The legitimacy of any such proposed departure is, of course, open to 
debate, since some departures are justified whereas others may not be. 
Despite what Mr. Scfiven has written (point 4 on p. 37, and point 5 on 
p. 38) I cannot agree that all definitions are analytic. Since the lexical 
definitions found in dictionaries are empirical reports of word usage, it is 
clear that at least one kind of definition (and the paradigm, at that) is 
not analytic. Stipulafive definitions can be regarded either as proposals 
to use the definiendum in a specified way ("Let us use the term 'war' to 
mean . . .") or as predictions that it will be used in a specified way ("In 
this discussion I shall use the term 'war' to mean . . ."). On the first 
interpretation the stiputative definition is a command or invitation and 
not a proposition at all, hence not an analytical proposition. And on the 
second interpretation it is a prediction which may be false, for many 
writers inadvertently depart from the usage they themselves had an- 
nounced; on this interpretation a stipulative definition is clearly a proposi- 
tion, but just as clearly it is not an analytical one. I suspect that Mr. 
Scriven is using the term "definition" in some sense which I have not 
managed to understand. 
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When I turn to Mr. Carmichael's discussion "Professor Copi Concern- 
ing Analysis" (this journal, October 1954) I am inclined to think that 
the disagreement between us is more apparent than real. I am in complete 
agreement with the first statement in his discussion. Analysis surely re- 
quires analytical means, that is, a body of terms already understood, or 
concepts already grasped, by whose means or in terms of which other terms 
or concepts may be analyzed, explicated, or defined. Let us call such a 
collection of terms or concepts an "analytical base." Thus classes and re- 
lations were the analytical base in terms of which the Frege-Russell analysis 
of number was carried out, sense data terms (plus logical ones) are the 
analytical base in terms of which phenomenalists have sought to analyze 
physical objects, and atoms of elements and their valence bonds are the 
analytical base used by chemists in their analyses of compounds. 
Certain formal criteria, such as consistency and noncireularity, can be 
appealed to in criticizing any analysis whatever. But a proposed analysis 
can also be criticized for inadequacies in its analytical base. The terms or 
concepts ingredient in a particular analytical base may themselves be chal- 
lenged, that is, regarded as problematic. The notion of class has been so 
challenged, and has been given various different analyses, some in terms 
of set theory, others in terms of extensions of functions. The notion of 
sense datum has also been challenged. And the problematic character of 
atoms has been (part of) the stimulation for physicists to construct more 
elaborate atomic theories involving more and different sub-atomic particles 
in their analytical bases. 
At this point let us refer to the dilemma which Mr. Carmichael poses 
very clearly on page 74: "If we are going to analyze, we must have the 
wherewithal, consisting, surely, of an apparatus of ideas; now these are 
to be either primitive or not; if primitive, they are prohibited; if not primi- 
tive, they cannot be expected to yield more than a superficial analysis." 
I have already indicated my agreement with the first clause in accepting 
the notion of an analytical base. But the notion of a "primitive" idea is 
surely relative to a context--as negation is primitive in the context of the 
Russell-Whitehead logic, but not primitive in the context of Nieod's 
system. In the context of any given analysis, the terms in the analytical 
base are of course primitive, and I did not intend to prohibit them, 
although my words unfortunately suggested to Mr. Carmiehael that I did. 
But when the terms in that analytical base are challenged, that new prob- 
lem determines a new context, and in that new context--if the demand 
for their analysis is met--they are not primitive but must be analyzed in 
terms of some new analytical base whose elements are primitive in the 
new context. 
The preceding remarks may seem to imply the start of an infinite re- 
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gression, and some philosophers have sought to avoid the threat of such 
regression by suggesting that there is some absolutely primitive level of 
rock bottom certainty beyond which analysis cannot penetrate. Russell's 
search for "hard data" (Scienti1% Method in Philosophy, pp. 70ff) seems 
to reflect this concern. Such suggestions strike me as being more dangerous 
than the threatened regression. First, because they seek to impose limits 
on the process of free inquiry, and, second, because to the extent that they 
simply assume their primitives to be unconditionally primitive, they must 
be recognized as varieties of dogmatism. Like the notion of preventive 
war, these suggestions seem to be more deadly than what they are intended 
to prevent. For there is, after all, only a threat of a regression. Its con- 
struction is contingent on the interests of philosophical analysts. Only if 
the terms primitive in a given analysis are challenged does a new context 
of inquiry arise. And in truth there is no end to philosophizing; no con- 
cepts need be regarded as sacrosanct. 
There is still a third alternative. W e  need not choose between becoming 
involved in a regression, on the one hand, or positing some absolutely 
primitive terms or concepts, on the other. A basis for explanation, that is, 
an analytical base, need not be either actually analyzed or held to be 
unanalyzable. There is a different method for appraising the worth of a 
proposed analytical base. It is adequate to the extent to which it permits 
the formulation of an adequate theory for explaining the various concepts 
to be analyzed in its terms. 
This criterion is the one used in appraising the adequacy of scientific 
hypotheses or theories. To the extent that a scientific theory is successful 
in accounting for the facts, that is, in organizing and systematizing the 
data in its field, to that extent it is regarded as correct or adequate. 
I suggest that the same general criteria apply to philosophical theories that 
apply to scientific ones. I would stress the continuity of scientific and philo- 
sophical inquiry, rather than their differences, although their differences 
are not to be denied. 
Let me summarize the view on which I hope I am in agreement with 
Mr. Carmichael. First, every analysis requires the use of some analytical 
base, which is a set of concepts that are used but  not themselves analyzed 
in that context. Second, those latter concepts may be themselves analyzed 
(in a different context), although that further analysis need not always 
be performed, and is not to be regarded as a necessary condition for, or a 
presupposition of, the initial analyses. Third, in defending the adequacy 
of a proposed analysis, one must be prepared to defend the adequacy of 
the analytical base used therein. To do so, one may either (1) go on to 
analyze the concepts used in that proposed analysis, or (2) maintain that 
those concepts are primitive and unanalyzable in some absolute sense, 
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or (3) urge their adequacy on the grounds that their use permits the 
formulation of a theory which accounts for the facts to be explained, and 
is corroborated by its utility in analyzing still further facts, or still addi- 
tional new terms or concepts. And in this connection alternative (3) seems 
least objectionable, in that it avoids the regression hinted at, though not 
strictly implied by (1), and in that it avoids the dogmatism of alterna- 
tive (2). 
The foregoing remarks are in agreement with Mr. Scriven's assertion 
(p. 37) that "The production of 'definitions' is at most a small part of 'the 
end results of philosophical analysis'." For the main task of the philosopher 
is to set up and work out the analytical base in whose terms definitions are 
to be formulated. 
Apart from its (perhaps deliberate) circularity, Mr. Scriven's remark 
(p. 39) that "the business of philosophical analysis is to appraise the cor- 
rectness or adequacy of philosophical analyses" is acceptable to me, though 
I should want to draw rather different conclusions from it than he does. 
It seems obvious to me that one task involved in appraising the adequacy 
of a proposed analysis is an examination of its analytical base. And a suffi- 
cient reason for rejecting that analytical base would be that its adoption 
would (somehow) preclude adequate analyses of other but  equally im- 
portant notions. Attention must surely be given to ensuring the mutual 
consistency of our analyses of different notions. Hence no single analysis 
can be accepted as finally satisfactory until other analyses have been accom- 
plished and seen to be consistent with that one. Mr. Seriven seems to 
ignore this problem, writing (p. 39) "And it is precisely insofar as philo- 
sophical analysis has abandoned the idea of an all-embracing 'theory of 
being' that it does not share 'the traditional goat of speeulative, systematic, 
synoptic philosophy'." I am not sure what Mr. Seriven means by his phrase 
"all-embracing theory of being." If he means an analytical base in whose 
terms analyses can be given for all other notions that philosophers deem 
worthy of analysis, then if they abandon that, philosophers run the risk 
of contradicting themselves in their analyses of different notions. 
This point has been extremely well put by D. I. O'Connor in a recent 
essay in Analysis (vol. 14, no. 5, April 1954, p. 110): "we can clarify the 
situation in our immediate vicinity by sweeping the difficulties out to the 
periphery. But sooner or later, these peripheral problems will become 
central in another context and we shall then find that our piecemeal 
methods of philosophizing have shifted our difficulties from one place to 
another instead of solving them. And that is, I suppose, one justification 
of the philosophical system-building that is at present so unfashionable." 
In my opinion Mr. O'Connor's "one justification" of the traditional goal 
of speculative, systematic, synoptic philosophy is ample justification for it. 
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That  it is unfashionable at present is but  one among many manifestations 
of the anxiety and "loss of nerve" charaeteristie of the period through which 
Western culture is now passing? 
Received August 6, 1955 
NOTE 
1 One critic has reported difficulty in finding in Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic 
any assertion that the proper task of philosophy is to provide definitions. I attributed 
that view to Ayer on the basis of his remarks on pages 49, 59, 62, 64-65, and 68 of 
the first edition of that work (repeated on pages 50-51, 55-56, 57, 58-59, and 60 of 
the second edition). 
On a Certain Use of Quotation Marks 
by G. P. H E N D E R S O N  
UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS 
WE ~EGIN with the familiar: 
(1) Seneca wrote that man is a rational animal 
Consider the suggestion that an analysis of (1) (of an elementary kind) 
is provided by 
(2) Seneca wrote "Man is a rational animal" 
The automatic objection to this is that Seneca wrote no such thing, just 
as Copernicus did not assert "The  planetary orbits are circles." 1 Hence, 
(3) Seneca did not write "Man is a rational animal" 
is true. 
L. J. Cohen and A. C. Lloyd have recently drawn attention to a dis- 
tinction in the use of quotation marks which, I suggest, could be used 
so as to 'correct' (2), with the minimum of rewriting, and bring it into 
consistency with (3). 2 They say that there is a "tacit convention . . . by 
which sentences can be quoted as being the sentences which . . . would 
be . . . uttered in the relevant contexts if the language there used . . . 
were . . . the same as that of the main text." ~ To mark the observance 
of this convention (which we may call Convention A) they propose that  
single quotation marks be employed. Such quoted sentences stand in 
contrast with quoted sentences which must be regarded as ipsissima verba, 
and hence are not  translatable. For them, the use of double quotation 
marks is proposed. 
According to this convention, not  only are (1) and (3) compatible, 
but  (3) would also be compatible with 
